Limited Government and Constitutionalism in India: Balancing Power and Accountability

Abstract

Limited government is a constitutional principle rooted in the idea of restricting state power to protect individual liberties and prevent authoritarian rule. In India, this concept has been enshrined in the Constitution through the separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism. This paper argues that a re-evaluation of the balance between state intervention and individual freedoms is necessary to ensure that the principle of limited government continues to serve as a bulwark against authoritarian tendencies while adapting to India’s socio-political realities. This research critically examines the evolution and operation of limited government in India, exploring how constitutional provisions, statutory frameworks, and judicial decisions have shaped its contours. Further, the research analyses the judiciary's role in maintaining the balance of power and enforcing the limits of government action, focusing on landmark Supreme Court judgments that have upheld constitutional checks on government authority. However, the application of limited government in India presents certain challenges. The article highlights key challenges that limit the effectiveness of this principle in India, such as the abuse of emergency power, money bills, colourable legislation and judicial overreach. Concerns about judicial overreach also raise questions about the judiciary’s role in preserving limited government. This research aims to contribute to the discourse on constitutional governance in India. It offers recommendations for strengthening the principle of limited government in the face of evolving social, political and legal dynamics.